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We present an empirical analysis of product differentiation using a new dynamic panel data set 
on film programming choice in a major U.S. metropolitan motion-pictures exhibition market.  
Using these data, we compute two measures of film programming choice, which allow us to 
investigate the determinants of strategic product differentiation in a multi-characteristics space.  
Our evidence is consistent with the idea that the degree of product differentiation between theatre 
pairs reflects a balance between strategic concerns and contractual constraints.  Similarity in one 
dimension is offset by differentiation in others. Our results further suggest that the degree of 
product differentiation is negatively related to market size.  Finally, we find that ownership 
matters:  theatres under common ownership make more similar programming choices than 
theatres with different owners.   
 
 












We are grateful to the DeSantis Center for Motion Picture Industry Studies of Florida Atlantic University College of 
Business and Economics for providing a grant to fund this research and to Synergy Retail for compiling data used in 
this paper.  For valuable comments and suggestions, we thank Bart Addis, Thomas Downes, F. Andrew Hanssen, 
Sanjiv Jaggia, Zaur Rzakhanov, Alfonso Sanchez-Penalver, Richard Startz, Andrew Sweeting, Chih Ming Tan, 
Charles Weinberg, Jeffrey Zabel, and seminar participants at Suffolk University, the DeSantis Center Summit 
Workshop, the International Industrial Organization Conference, and the CORE Université Catholique de Louvain 
Conference on Hotelling’s Legacy and its Future.  We are grateful to Vicky Huang, Anna Kumysh, and Vidisha 






The seminal analysis by Hotelling (1929) on “Stability in Competition” has sparked a 
large and growing theoretical literature concerned with the following deceptively simple 
questions. Should we expect to find, as Hotelling claimed, that firms offering horizontally 
differentiated products choose product designs with minimum differentiation?  Or, should we 
expect to find, as d’Aspremont et al. (1979) claim in their critique of Hotelling, that these same 
firms seek maximal differentiation in their product designs in order to soften competition?   
The simple but frustrating answer to these theoretical questions is that “it depends”.   
Specifically, it depends upon the particular modeling assumptions that we make.  Borenstein and 
Netz (1999) aptly characterize the reason for the theoretical ambiguity.
1  Non-cooperative firms 
balance two forces when making their location, or, more generally, product-design choices: an 
“attraction” force that draws a firm closer to its rivals in order to steal business from them and a 
“repulsion” force that induces firms to separate in order to soften competition.
2  There is no a 
priori reason to believe that one of these forces always dominates the other.  
When theory is inconclusive, we must turn to empirical or experimental investigation to 
shed light on the interplay between these attraction and repulsion forces.  Unfortunately, very 
few such investigations are available.  Significant exceptions include Borenstein and Netz (1999) 
and Netz and Taylor (2002) who provide empirical evidence on this tension as it affects airline 
departure scheduling and the location of gas stations, respectively.  Davis (2006) develops an 
empirical model of consumer choice in the U.S. motion-pictures industry, using spatial and 
                                                 
1  In addition, they provide an extensive review of the current literature on product differentiation.  See also 
Chisholm and Norman (2004). 
2  Tirole (1988) refers to a similar tension between differentiation to soften price competition and agglomeration to 





3  Seim (2005) develops a model of entry, allowing product 
price to be endogenously determined, using data from the retail video rental market, focusing on 
spatial differentiation.  Sweeting (2006) extends the concept of spatial differentiation to 
similarities and differences in radio programming choices, and Berry and Waldfogel (2001) 
provide evidence of increased product variety with increasing market concentration in the same 
industry. 
Our paper adds to this literature by examining a dynamic type of product differentiation: 
the weekly film programming choices made by first-run movie theatres within the well-defined 
geographic area of the Boston metropolitan market.   We can think of a first-run movie theatre as 
offering a product with multiple characteristics:  besides the location of the theatre there is also 
the number of different films being shown and the number of screenings of these films.  On this 
basis, movie theatre i is less differentiated from movie theatre j in a particular period the more 
movies, or screenings, they have in common in that period. 
Our analysis allows us to provide empirical evidence with respect to several important 
questions relating to product design and product re-design.   
First, do first-run movie theatres that are in more direct competition with each other on 
one dimension, such as the locations of the theatres, adopt product designs – film programming 
selections – that are more, or less, similar?  Unfortunately, theory is largely silent on product 
design choices when products have multiple characteristics. Irmen and Thisse (1998) provide 
one of the few such analyses.  They develop a model with quadratic utility loss that might be 
                                                 
3 Corts (2001) empirically examines the related issue of the impact vertical market structure has on U.S. motion-
picture releases.  Mazzeo (2002a and 2002b) finds evidence of product differentiation as a mechanism to soften 
competition in the motel industry.  There is also preliminary work by Einav (2003), which treats the timing of 




expected to generate maximal differentiation, but show that if there is a “dominant” 
characteristic, then firms will maximally differentiate on this characteristic and minimally 
differentiate on the others.   
Our empirical context is, of course, much more complex than that envisaged by Irmen 
and Thisse.  Complicating factors include: heterogeneous consumers; product characteristics that 
are not easily classified as being dominant or dominated; and the ability to change product 
design (movie mix) over time at relatively low cost.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that an empirical implication of the Irmen and Thisse analysis is that if movie theatres are 
“close” to each other in one set of characteristics, whether by choice or as a result of an 
exogenous factor, they will seek to differentiate themselves on other characteristics.  Tirole (op. 
cit.) and much of the marketing literature
4 offer similar predictions: simply put, it pays to be 
different, but not too different. 
Second, to what extent does ownership matter in product design?  A familiar and not 
surprising result from theory is that multi-product firms typically make different location or 
product design choices from single-product non-cooperative oligopolists.
5   I n  o u r  s p e c i f i c  
context, we should expect that a multi-outlet firm, such as a theatre chain, makes different design 
decisions from those of a single-outlet firm.  Full coordination of product-design choice by a 
particular multi-outlet firm is unlikely to be feasible, however, since this firm is also in 
competition with other single- and multi-outlet firms.  
A novel feature of our data is that we track weekly movie selection for each first-run 
theatre in our sample for a period of 52 weeks.  This allows us to examine some of the dynamics 
                                                 
4  See, for example, Kerin et al. (2006). 




of product differentiation.   In particular, the specific contractual system within which the movie 
theatres operate has a significant impact on the exhibitors’ choice of which movies to show in 
particular weeks.  The major studios typically release what they hope to be “blockbuster” movies 
close to important holidays and negotiate with the distributors and exhibitors to secure extensive 
coordinated release of these movies: the release of the final film in the “Lord of the Rings” 
trilogy is just one case in point.  As a result, we would expect to find greater similarity in movie 
selection nearer to major holidays but rather less similarity in weeks “far” from the major 
holidays.   
However, we should be careful not to push this interpretation of the “holiday effect” too 
far.  Theatre managers can at least partially offset similarity in programming choice forced by 
exhibitors at major holidays through their choices of the other films that they show in those 
weeks.   Moreover, the conjectured “holiday effect” can be attributed to another important factor.  
There is strong evidence of significant seasonality in movie attendance (Einav 2007), with 
audience size reaching a peak at the major holidays and declining away from the holidays.  The 
theoretical literature is largely silent on the relationship between market size and product 
differentiation.  In related analysis of product line rivalry, however, preliminary results 
(Chisholm and Norman, 2006a) indicate that as market size increases we should expect to find 
more overlap in product lines.  In our specific application, we should find a positive relationship 
between similarity in programming choice and each theatre owner’s prior on expected aggregate 
movie attendance for a particular week.   
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.  First, movie theatres that are located 




Second, similarity is high close to major holidays but then declines with “distance” from such 
holidays.  Third, ownership matters in the sense that theatre pairs under common ownership tend 
to be more similar in their film programming choices than do theatre pairs that have different 
owners.  The first two results are consistent with our theoretical expectations.  The third implies 
that the advantages of centralized contracting by theatres’ owners with movie distributors, and 
the importance of the center’s reading of the market, affect programming choice more than local 
strategic considerations. 
In the next section we develop our measures of similarity in product design.  Section III 
proposes a number of empirically testable determinants of similarity; Section IV describes the 
data, their sources and institutional background; Section V presents our empirical analysis; and 
Section VI provides concluding remarks. 
II Measuring  Product  Differentiation  in a Strategic Market Setting 
The dependent variable throughout our analysis is the degree of product similarity, 
measured weekly, between pairs of first-run movie theatres.  We consider two such measures.  
The first, SAijt,  motivated by Jaffe (1986), measures the angle between two vectors whose 
elements reflect each theatre’s product attributes (movies being shown) between theatre i and 
theatre j in a particular week t.  This is an inverse measure of similarity in that the greater the 
angle, the lower is the similarity.
6  The second, SMijt, measures the percentage of movie matches 
between theatre i and theatre j, in a particular week t, relative to the total number of possible 
matches, with an appropriate normalization described below, and so provides a direct measure of 
similarity. 
                                                 




A complication in measuring similarity in our specific context is that popular films may 
be shown on multiple screens in a given week.  As a result, our measure of similarity will differ 
depending upon whether we measure similarity in screenings or similarity in movies.  Our 
econometric analysis considers both screening and movie measures of similarity. 
For both the angular and the matching measures of similarity, we consider a well-defined 
geographic market, in our case the Boston metropolitan area.  For each week t we begin by 
counting the total number of films, Nt, playing in the first-run movie theatres across the entire 
market on a particular day:  given our data sources, we chose the Friday of each week.  We 
define the angular measure, SAijt, based on screenings, as follows.  The attributes vector Ait for 
theatre i in week t has length Nt, where the nth element anit corresponds to the nth film, with the 
films ordered alphabetically.  Suppose theatre i has five screens, each of which can show four 
films on a typical Friday and thus possesses a total “showings capacity” of 20 time slots.     
Suppose further that in week t theatre i is showing four films, one of which is presented on two 
screens, out of a total of ten films that are being shown across the entire market that week. The 
elements of the attributes vector corresponding to the four films playing at theatre i are the 
percentages of screen capacity devoted to each film.  In the present example, three of the anit 
cells equal 0.20; the fourth cell, corresponding to the film showing on two screens, equals 0.40.  
The remaining six cells of the attributes vector equal zero to reflect the absence of a current film 
from theatre i’s offerings in that week.  The attributes vector Ajt for theatre j is constructed 
analogously. 
The angular measure of the similarity between the two theatres’ film offerings based on 


















SA arccos         (1) 
converted to degrees.  Thus if the two theatres have an identical set of films, with an identical 
distribution across screens, the angle between the vectors will be zero.  The angle between the 
vectors increases, and approaches 90 degrees, the more dissimilar or differentiated the theatres 
are relative to one another. 
An alternative angular measure we consider focuses on a simple comparison of films 
showing at theatres i and j.  Again, in week t we begin with a vector of length Nt as defined 
above.  If a film is playing at theatre i, the element in the vector corresponding to that film equals 
one; it equals zero otherwise.  If both theatre i and theatre j are showing the same set of films, 
even if the capacity distribution differs, the angle between the movie-count attributes vectors will 
be zero, implying “identical” products in a qualitative, but not proportionate, sense.  As the two 
theatres’ offerings diverge, this angular measure again approaches 90 degrees.
7 
A particular advantage of the angular measure of similarity, whether based on screenings 
or films, is that the “measure of proximity is purely directional i.e. it is not directly affected by 
the length of the (A) vectors.” (Jaffe, 1986, p. 986, fn 5)  In our specific context, the angular 
measure of similarity is unaffected by variation in the number of films shown in different weeks. 
A limitation of the angular measure, however, is that it is sensitive to differences in the 
number of screens between theatres i and j:  the greater is this difference, the greater SAijt is 
likely to be.  In contrast to the matching measure (see below), no simple normalization for the 
                                                 
7 Note that the angular measures we propose are, in fact, measures of dissimilarity; that is, as the angular measures 
increase, the theatres’ offerings are more dissimilar.  For ease of exposition, we refer to these measures as similarity 




impact of differences in numbers of screens suggests itself.  As a result, in the empirical 
implementation we include an independent variable that is designed to capture this effect. 
The second similarity measure we consider is derived from the percentage of matches 
between two theatres and thus quite naturally ranges between zero and one as two theatres move 
from perfectly dissimilar, or highly differentiated, to perfectly identical, or homogeneous.  Once 
again, we must take into account two complicating factors.  First, the number of screens at a 
particular theatre affects the movie mix that the theatre can offer.  Second, there is the possibility 
that a particular film might be shown on multiple screens in one theatre but not in another.   
This suggests the following approach for any pair of theatres i and j in each week t.  For 
each film playing at theatre i, determine if that film is also playing at theatre j in that week.  If so, 
and if the film is playing three times at theatre i and four times at theatre j, the number-of-
screenings matches for this film is three.  Add this to the other number-of-screenings matches for 
all other common films across both theatres to derive the total number of screenings in common, 
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where  h S  is the number of screenings that is possible at movie theatre h = i, j.   
  An obvious limitation of Sijt is that, while it is distributed on the interval [0, 1], it is 
concatenated in this interval if  ij SS ≠ .  In other words, as with the angular measure the 
matching measure in (2) is affected by differences in the number of screens between theatre 




normalize Sijt by the maximum degree of similarity  () ( ) ( )
2
min , ij i j i j SS S S S = ⋅  and scale it by 
100 to give a percentage match, leading to the matching similarity measure: 
















SM        ( 3 )  
The normalized matching similarity index (3) can be thought of as a count measure, 
reflecting the number of “successes” (or matches) the two products mutually possess, relative to 
the maximum potential for success (or matches).  Note also that, as with the angular measure, Nt 
does not directly affect this measure of similarity. 
III  Determinants of Product Similarity 
We now turn to the specific strategic and institutional factors that might be expected to 
influence the degree of similarity in film programming choice between two theatres.  In doing so, 
we distinguish between time-invariant effects that are likely to affect similarity in programming 
across weeks and time-variant effects that are likely to affect the dynamics of film programming 
choice.  
Given the nature of our data and the theory discussed in the introduction, there are three 
obvious time-invariant effects that we expect will influence the degree of similarity in movie 
selection for each theatre pair.  First, theatres that are located close to each other are likely to be 
in competition much more directly than those that are geographically separated.  In order to test 
for this effect we construct DISTANCEij, the distance in miles between theatre i and theatre j, 
derived from GPS data for each theatre.  We expect that theatres more closely located to each 
other in one characteristic, in this case geographic location, will seek to differentiate themselves 




expect the angular similarity index to decrease, and the proportionate similarity index to 
increase, with DISTANCE.
8  To test the robustness of our distance measure, we also consider 
travel time between theatre i  and theatre j  as an alternative measure, using estimates from 
MapQuest.com based on each theatre’s street address.   
Second, we expect to find that “ownership matters” in film programming choice, but in 
this case precisely how is not clear a priori.  To capture the different incentives that might arise 
when two theatres are owned by the same company, we create the dummy variable 
SAMEOWNERij, which equals one if theatre i and theatre j are owned by the same company, and 
zero otherwise.  If companies negotiate better contracting terms with distributors when movies 
are acquired in bulk, or if programming decisions are centralized and affected by the “center’s” 
reading of the market, we would expect SAMEOWNER to increase programming similarity.  By 
contrast, if programming decisions are centralized and dominated by the desire to avoid direct 
competition between theatres under common ownership, we would expect SAMEOWNER to 
decrease similarity.  Finally, if individual theatres behave autonomously, with inter-theatre 
competitive forces dominating programming choice, and with few economies from large-scale 
distribution contracts, then SAMEOWNER should have little or no effect. 
Third, we expect that programming choice will be affected at least in part by 
demographics, to the extent that movie-going choices differ by the precise characteristics of the 
movie-going population “close to,” and thus within, the natural catchment area of a particular 
movie theatre.  We test for the importance of differences in a number of demographic variables, 
                                                 
8 A movie distributor might decide that only one theatre, within close proximity to another, is allowed to show a 
particular film based on a clearance zone.   While data are not available on the specific clearance terms of the films 




including age, income, population, and households, each measured within three-, five-, and ten-
mile radii of each of the theatres in a given ij pair. 
We noted in the introduction that film programming choice across theatres is likely to be 
affected by proximity to major holidays for two reasons.  First, since our focus is on first-run 
theatres in a major metropolitan area, we would expect similarity in programming choice to be 
greatest in the vicinity of major holidays when many of the theatre owners are contractually 
committed to allocate multiple screens to “holiday” films, whose release dates are announced 
several months in advance.  Second, we expect to find a relationship between seasonality in 
demand, as documented in Einav (2007), and programming similarity.  Specifically, we expect to 
find greater (lesser) similarity in programming choice when expected demand is high (low). 
We test for the seasonality, or market size, effect in three ways.  First, we use 
HOLIDAYDISTANCEt, defined as the number of weeks the current week is away from the 
nearest holiday.  If the current week is a holiday week, HOLIDAYDISTANCEt equals zero.  If the 
current week is between two holidays, the total number of weeks between the two holidays is 
divided in half.  As a result, HOLIDAYDISTANCE increases with the number of weeks away 
from the first holiday until it reaches the midpoint between the two holidays, then declines 
incrementally until it reaches zero again at the next holiday.  To check for the robustness of this 
control, we also consider the number of weeks since the preceding holiday, which allows for 
demand seasonality to take the form of spikes followed by decay rather than smooth increases 
prior to, and decreases following, a major holiday.  We use Memorial Day, the Fourth of July, 
Thanksgiving, and Christmas as the holidays in our sample, reflecting the historical importance 
                                                                                                                                                             
similarity.  See Filson (2005) for a common-agency model of the distributor-exhibitor relationship and for further 




of these major holidays for revenue generation for motion-pictures exhibitors and consistent 
with the empirical identification of major holidays in Einav (2007). 
Second, we construct AGGREGATEREVENUEt, defined as the total revenue, measured 
in millions of 2001 dollars, across all of the first-run theatres in our sample in week t, which we 
take as a measure of market size.
9  It would be preferable, of course, to use aggregate revenue 
from the previous year as a measure of anticipated revenues and thus of anticipated market size.  
Data limitations preclude us from doing so.  However, Einav’s analysis, and the high correlation 
between HOLIDAYDISTANCE and AGGREGATEREVENUE (see Figure 1), lend support to the 
view that the pattern of revenues is likely to be quite stable year to year, and it is this pattern, 
rather than the actual levels, that we consider to be important in determining programming 
similarity.
10 
(Figure 1 near here) 
Third, we can estimate the time-variant effects by introducing weekly time dummies.  If 
we are correct in arguing that market size effects are important, we should find a close 
relationship between the estimated time dummies and HOLIDAYDISTANCE or 
AGGREGATEREVENUE. 
Finally, we address the possibility of serial correlation following Petersen (2005).   We 
present the details of our estimation approach in Section V. 
IV Film-Programming  Data  and Institutional Background 
The implementation of our econometric analysis is based upon data drawn from the first-
run motion-pictures exhibition market in the Boston metropolitan area.  The market contains 13 
                                                 
9  We use aggregate revenue for the whole sample rather than by ij-pair to avoid endogeneity problems. 




first-run theatres in and around Boston: see Figure 2 for their locations.
11  For each theatre, for 
each week from June 30, 2000 through the week of June 22, 2001, we have information from 
Nielsen EDI on which films were playing, and on the revenues generated at each theatre by each 
film for that week.  We supplemented these data by recording screening times on the Friday of 
each week, for each film, for each theatre in our data set. Screening-time information was 
determined by reviewing Boston Globe movie advertisements on microfilm.  This screening 
information is the basis for constructing the screenings-count similarity indexes.
12  
One first-run theatre in Quincy advertised in the Boston Globe from June 30, 2000 
through September 28, 2000, but did not advertise for the remainder of the time period.  We have 
excluded the Quincy theatre from our main empirical analysis due to these missing observations.  
However, when we include Quincy in our analysis and limit our period of study to June 30
th 
through September 28
th, we obtain results qualitatively similar to our main findings, presented in 
Tables 2 through 4.  These findings are documented in detail in Section V along with our main 
results. 
(Figure 2 near here)  
                                                 
11  Synergy Retail Group, a retail real estate market research services firm, collected the baseline data set used in our 
analysis.  Synergy determined each theatre’s type based on theatre advertisements and by contacting theatres 
directly, as needed.  All theatres in the Boston and surrounding area were classified into three types:  first-run 
(excluding arthouse theatres); arthouse; and second-run or discount.  The present paper focuses only on first-run 
theatres.  We exclude arthouse and second-run theatres on the assumption that such theatres serve markets with 
consumer preferences for different attributes (e.g., film type; currency of film) from the first-run theatre market.  We 
limit the geographic scope of the market to an area described as within or near the radial market defined by the I-95 
loop around Boston.  See Figure 2 for the specific geographical boundaries. 
12 One might expect theatres to further differentiate their offerings from their competitors’ by exhibiting films at 
non-overlapping times.  On this margin, however, a typical exhibition format includes showing a film in the early 
afternoon, the late afternoon, the early evening, and the later evening.  Deviations from this format are more 
common within a given theatre, when a film is shown on more than one screen, than across theatres.  An interesting 
question for further study is why theatres do not generally deviate from a common structure of film showings.  A 
notable experiment in the profitability from varying exhibition time slots in the Netherlands is documented in 




Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The total number of observations for each 
of the similarity indexes is 4,056, generated for 78 ij pairs over the 52 weeks we study. As we 
noted above, the angular similarity index is restricted to the interval [0, 90] while the matching 
index is restricted to the interval [0, 1].  The mean of the angular index is 39.74 and of the 
matching index is 0.80.  This indicates that there is some underlying degree of similarity in film 
programming choice across the theatre pairs in our sample.  However, there is also considerable 
variability in film programming choice, as indicated by the ranges of the angular and matching 
indexes.  Figure 3, which illustrates the weekly pattern in the angular similarity measure for one 
theatre relative to the others in the sample,
13 further suggests that while there are significant 
differences in the degree of similarity across theatre pairs, there is some consistency in the 
variation in the similarity measure over time, perhaps as a result of the seasonal and contractual 
issues noted above and identified in Einav (2007).   
(Table 1 near here) 
(Figure 3 near here) 
DISTANCE between two ij pairs varies from a minimum of little over a mile, the distance 
between Copley Place and Fenway 13, both in Boston, to a maximum of roughly 54 miles, the 
distance between Liberty Tree Mall, Danvers and Showcase Cinemas, Randolph.  The mean 
distance between theatre pairs is roughly 19 miles.  Figure 1 suggests, and Table 1 confirms, that 
there is no significant difference in the average distance between theatres in our sample that are 
under the same ownership and those that are owned by different chains. 
SAMEOWNER has a mean of 0.28 indicating that roughly twenty-eight percent of the ij 




comprising the first-run Boston market during our period of study:  National Amusements 
Corporation; General Cinema (G.C.) Corporation; and Loews Cineplex Entertainment 
Corporation.
14  Of these three companies, National Amusements held the dominant market 
position, owning six theatres, spread across the radial market around Boston, with significant 
coverage on or near the I-95 loop enclosing the Boston metropolitan area.  General Cinema 
Corporation owned four theatres, distributed in a similar pattern to National Amusements’ 
capacity, but on a smaller scale, and with proportionately greater market concentration closer to 
Boston.
15  Loews owned four theatres, whose locations were concentrated in the 
Boston/Cambridge area, with one theatre located further north on the I-95 loop.
16   
HOLIDAYDISTANCE has a mean of four and a maximum of ten, attained in week 11 and 
in weeks 36 and 37 in our sample.  These are the weeks that lie midway between the Fourth of 
July and Thanksgiving, and between Christmas and Memorial Day, respectively.   
Figure 4 compares HOLIDAYDISTANCE to the mean similarity indexes for each week 
for the total sample, for theatre pairs under the same ownership, and for theatre pairs under 
different ownership.  A number of implications follow from this figure, each of which is tested 
formally in our econometric analysis.  It does indeed seem to be the case that there is an inverse 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 The theatre we chose was Assembly Square. 
14  Theatres owned by National Amusements include:  Cleveland Circle Cinemas (Brookline); Quincy Cinemas; 
Showcase Cinemas of Dedham; Showcase Cinemas of Randolph; Showcase Cinemas of Revere; and Showcase 
Cinemas of Woburn.  Theatres owned by General Cinema include:  Braintree 10; Burlington 10; Chestnut Hill 
Cinema 5; and Fenway 13 (Boston).  Theatres owned by Loews Cineplex Entertainment include:  Assembly Square 
(Somerville); Copley Place (Boston); Fresh Pond 10 (Cambridge); and Liberty Tree Mall (Danvers).  Note that this 
description includes the Quincy theatre; see discussion in note 11. 
15 General Cinema Corporation filed for Chapter 11 reorganization on October 11, 2000; AMC Entertainment won 
approval to acquire General Cinema’s assets in March 2002.  The GCC theatres in the Boston market operated 
continuously throughout our period of study, and the quality and features of the theatres were similar to competing 
first-run theatres in the Boston market.  See “Court Approves GC Cos. Sale to AMC,” Boston Business Journal, 




relationship between similarity in film programming choice and “distance” from major holidays 
(recall that the angular index is an inverse measure of similarity).  Further, the dynamics of film 
programming choice seem quite similar whether the theatres pairs are under the same or different 
ownership.  However, ownership appears to be important, with theatre pairs under common 
ownership typically exhibiting more similar film programming than those under different 
ownership.    
(Figure 4 near here) 
The demographic variables, which measure the absolute value of differences in 
demographic values within five-mile radii of theatre i compared to the values within a five-mile 
radius of theatre j, cover age, income, population, and number of households.  The AGEDIFF 
and  INCOMEDIFF variables measure differences in average age and average income, 
respectively.  The means of AGEDIFF, INCOMEDIFF, POPULATIONDIFF, and 
HOUSEHOLDDIFF are:  1.48 years; 14,127 dollars (2001 base year); 351,241; and 148,512, 
respectively.  We focus on differences in age distribution and income in the econometric 
analysis. 
No first-run theatres in this market opened or closed during the 52-week period of our 
study.  Thus we can treat the spatial structure of the market as essentially constant throughout the 
period of study.  Further, when we examine the theatre i and theatre j pairs using panel-data 
techniques, we work with a balanced data set.   
                                                                                                                                                             
16Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corporation resulted from the merger of Sony/Loews Theatres and Cineplex 
Odeon Corporation in May 1998.  We treat theatres operating under either the name of Sony or Loews as being 




V  Econometric Model and Results 
A number of econometric considerations arise in our analysis.  While our data set 
includes cross-sectional observations of theatre pairs over time, our main explanatory variables 
are time invariant:  DISTANCE, SAMEOWNER, and differences in demographic characteristics.  
The time-varying HOLIDAYDISTANCE and AGGREGATEREVENUE serve mainly to capture 
seasonality (and so variation in market size) as documented in Einav (2007).  More generally, in 
a panel-data application such as this, we must explicitly model time and theatre-pair effects, as 
argued in Petersen (2005). 
We estimate equations of the following general form, where SIijt represents the similarity 
index of interest, either angular (SAijt) or matching (SMijt): 
  SIijt = α + xijtβ1 + νij β2+ εijt        ( 4 )  
Equation 4 states that the similarity index for a given theatre pair, in a given week, will be a 
function of time-invariant strategic factors, νij, within a given ij theatre pair, and of time-varying 
factors, arising primarily from seasonality.  The residual term, εijt, is subject to two potential 
sources of non-sphericalness.  First, there may be a theatre-pair-specific component of the error 
term.  And second, the panel may be characterized by some degree of serial correlation. 
To address the first point, we estimate Equation 4 with pooled OLS using Rogers (1993) 
standard errors, clustered by theatre-pair.  Second, following Petersen (2005), when both cross-
sectional and time effects characterize a panel, cluster analysis by pair-specific effects should be 
accompanied by parametric estimation of time effects.  One such approach would include 
dummy variables for each time period.  We adopt this approach, in effect, by including the 




repeat the estimations using AGGREGATEREVEVNUE and using weekly time dummies.  The 
resulting estimates were effectively identical to those detailed below.  We report the estimates 
using HOLIDAYDISTANCE since we have a clean prior expectation with respect to the impact of 
HOLIDAYDISTANCE on programming similarity. 
To summarize, we estimate the following reduced-form equation, using pooled OLS, 
with Rogers standard errors, clustered by theatre pair
17:  
SIijt=  α + β1HOLIDAYDISTANCEt  +  β2SAMEOWNERij + β3DISTANCEij  + 
β4AGEDIFFij  +  εijt         ( 5 )    
where the dependent variable represents either the angular measure of similarity or the 
normalized matching measure.  Note that for the angular measures, we also include 
SCREENDIFF as an independent variable to control for differences in number of screens 
between theatres; this control is implicitly captured in the normalized similarity measure.  In 
addition, we extend this regression by systematically replacing AGEDIFF with the three other 
demographic variables discussed previously. 
One complication arises due to the fact that our dependent variable is truncated either on 
the interval [0, 90] or [0, 1]. This truncation means that we might obtain predicted values outside 
the range of actual possible values.  One way of addressing this limitation is to transform the 
dependent variable using, for example, a log-odds ratio.  A drawback of such a transformation is 
                                                 
17 An alternative specification for panel data is random-effects estimation.  With only one time-varying independent 
variable, functioning, in effect, as a time dummy, the present estimation is a better fit with the data, following 
Petersen (2005).  Random-effects estimation yields results qualitatively similar to our main findings, presented in 
Tables 2 through 4.  The confidence interval on HOLIDAYDISTANCE is more narrow in the random-effects 




that the interpretation of the estimated coefficients then becomes more complicated.  Thus our 
preferred strategy is to report coefficients estimated using the truncated variables.
18 
The estimation results for the angular showtimes similarity index are presented in Table 
2, Regression I.  We include the demographic variable AGEDIFF in Regression I; we replace 
this demographic with INCOMEDIFF in Regression II.   
(Table 2 near here) 
The results in Table 2 indicate that theatres’ offerings become more differentiated the 
more geographically proximate they are:  a one mile reduction in distance between two theatres 
increases the angle between their attributes vectors by half a degree.  This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that similarity in one characteristic, in this case location, will lead theatres to 
differentiate themselves in other characteristics, film programming, in order to soften 
competition between them.  This result is robust to replacing the Euclidean distance between two 
theatres with travel distance.
19   
It is also clear that ownership affects similarity, although we noted above that the 
expected sign of SAMEOWNER is ambiguous.  Our results show that two theatres owned by the 
same company are more similar in their film offerings than are two theatres owned by separate 
companies:  changing to same ownership decreases the angle between the attributes vectors by 
five degrees.  This suggests that the economies from studio-exhibitor contracts, and centralized 
control of movie program choice, are more important than coordination of programming choices 
                                                 
18 The matching index, SMijt, is the more appropriate candidate for a log-odds transformation, since it ranges from 
zero to one; with appropriate adjustments for values of zero and one, the problem of out-of-range predictions is 
addressed.  The results for the SMijt estimations are qualitatively similar to those presented in Section V when the 
estimation is repeated using a log-odds transform, log(SMijt/(1-SMijt)). 
19   We repeated Regression I in Table 2 including only theatre pairs with DISTANCE  less than 15 miles and 




to mitigate business stealing from a chain’s own theatres.  It should be noted, however, that this 
result is specific to our particular context.  Sweeting’s (2006) study of music variety in the radio 
industry finds the opposite effect:  radio stations under common ownership, within the same 
local market, tend to be more differentiated in their music programming choices. 
It might be suggested that there is some relationship between DISTANCE and 
SAMEOWNER.  There are, however, two reasons for rejecting this.  First, as we noted in the 
previous section, there is no significant difference in the average distance between theatres in our 
sample that are under the same ownership and those that are owned by different chains.  Second, 
when we include the interaction term DISTANCE*SAMEOWNER in our estimation, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant.  
As expected, program selection in a particular week is more similar across theatres the 
nearer the week is to a major holiday, consistent with Einav’s (2007) seasonality results:  each 
additional week away from a major holiday increases the angle between attributes vectors by one 
degree.  There is an industry pattern of wide release of holiday films, expected to appeal to a 
large audience, followed by more limited releases of a larger number of films expected to 
succeed in niche markets.  The former effect leads to greater similarity in programming choice 
close to holidays, while the latter provides theatres more flexibility to capitalize strategically on 
theatre-specific strengths when market size is smaller.  
When we replace HOLIDAYDISTANCE with HOLIDAYRIGHT, which measures the 
distance to the most-recent holiday, we still find a highly statistically significant coefficient, but 
the coefficient on HOLIDAYRIGHT is between one-third and one-half the size of the coefficient 




has more economic significance than distance from a holiday that has recently passed.  It further 
suggests that it is the “build up” to a holiday, rather than an asymmetric decay, that is important 
in determining programming similarity, again consistent with patterns found in Einav (2007) for 
some of the major industry holidays.   
This argument is further supported by the results that we obtain when we repeat the 
estimations using weekly time dummies.  Figure 5 shows that there is a close relationship 
between the estimated coefficients on weekly time dummies and HOLIDAYDISTANCE. 
(Figure 5 near here) 
Differences in demographic characteristics of neighboring populations also have a 
significant influence on the degree of differentiation in programming choice. We find a positive 
and significant impact of average age differences, within a five-mile radius of each theatre, on 
the degree of differentiation within a theatre pair.
20  In other words, larger differences in the age 
of the surrounding population lead to more differentiated programming.  The industry has long 
believed that the choice of which movie to see is significantly affected by the age of the movie-
goer.  If this is the case, then markets with very different age groups are likely to be serving 
consumers with different tastes, weakening the strategic interaction between these markets and 
leaving film programming choice to be determined more by taste than strategic considerations.
21  
                                                 
20 The age effect is insignificant at the three-mile and ten-mile radial measures.  We find that larger income 
differences lead to more similar programming, significant at the .10 level.  The income effect is insignificant at the 
three-mile radial measure and significant at a ten-mile radius.  When POPDIFF or HOUSEHOLDDIFF replaces the 
age demographic, neither is significant at three-, five-, or ten-mile radii.   




 When we replace the angular showtimes similarity index with the angular movie-count 
index, we obtain results that are substantively similar to the signs, magnitudes of the coefficients, 
and significance levels of the results in Table 2.  Table 3 presents these results.
22 
(Table 3 near here) 
The estimation results of Equation 5 using the normalized matching similarity index are 
presented in Table 4.
23  Note that the interpretation of the coefficients in Table 4 is the opposite 
of the interpretation for the angular measure:  the angular measure increases with differentiation; 
the matching measure increases with similarity.   
(Table 4 near here) 
The results for this alternative similarity measure are qualitatively consistent with those 
for the angular similarity index.  Similarity between theatre pairs decreases when theatres are 
geographically proximate, increases when theatres are under common ownership, and decreases 
the further the time period is from major holidays.  The results are robust to replacing show 
counts with movie counts as the basis for constructing the similarity index.
24  
VI  Conclusion  
Hotelling’s claim that non-cooperative oligopolists will offer consumers product variants 
characterized by an “excessive sameness” has given rise to considerable debate.  The result has 
been a large and growing theoretical literature with little consistency in its predictions and so 
                                                 
22 The demographic patterns mirror those found in Table 2; AGEDIFF is also positive and significant, at the .10 
level, at a three-mile radius.  The income effect is insignificant at three- and ten-mile radii.  Neither the population 
nor the household measure is significant at three-, five-, or ten-mile radii 
23 The demographic patterns are as follows.  AGEDIFF is no longer significant for any of the three-, five-, or ten-
mile radii.  The income effect is positive and significant at the .10 level at the five- and ten-mile radii, but 
insignificant at the three-mile radius.  Population and household effects are insignificant at the three- and five-mile 




with few clear empirically testable propositions.  This is, in fact, not at all surprising.  As 
Borenstein and Netz (1999) point out, firms competing in a simple, one-dimensional 
characteristics space seek to balance competing forces: an attraction force as they try to steal 
each others’ markets and a repulsion force as they seek to soften competition.  There is no reason 
to believe a priori that either of these forces will dominate the other.  
Recent economic analysis and our reading of the marketing literature suggest that when 
the analysis is extended to a multi-characteristics space we have cleaner testable propositions.  
Simply put, we should expect to find that when firms either choose or are constrained to be more 
similar in some characteristics they will seek to differentiate themselves in others.  In addition, 
we should expect to find greater similarity in larger, as opposed to smaller, markets.      
Our analysis has tested and provides strong support for these propositions using a 
dynamic data set from the U.S. motion-pictures exhibition market.  In particular, our empirical 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the degree of product differentiation between 
theatre pairs reflects a complex balance between strategic concerns and contractual 
considerations.  Theatre pairs located more closely in geographic space make less similar 
programming choices.  Programming similarity increases close to major holidays and declines as 
we move away from such holidays.  These results suggest that when firms’ product design 
choices are similar in one dimension, strengthening the business-stealing effect that underlies the 
attraction force, the repulsion force leads them to seek to differentiate in other dimensions.   
Theory is less clear regarding the impact of ownership on product differentiation.  Our analysis 
has found evidence that theatre pairs under common ownership tend to make more similar 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 The signs of the coefficients remain the same as in Table 4.  All of the variables that are statistically significant in 




programming choices.  This may well reflect the organizational architecture in this industry, 
where local managers’ autonomy to make programming choices is constrained by the movie-
studio/theatre-chain relationship.  It suggests more generally that the impact of ownership on 
strategic product differentiation is institution specific. 
Several extensions of this work suggest themselves.  Both the angular and matching 
indexes provide robust, dimensionless measures of the degree of differentiation between pairs of 
products that can be easily modified to measure product-attribute differences in a wide range of 
industries.  This offers the potential for broader empirical investigation of the determinants of 
product differentiation and product similarity.  Looking specifically at the movie exhibition 
market, the basic unit of analysis in this paper has been the degree of similarity between theatre 
pairs.  Similarity, in turn, is determined by specific decision-making at the individual theatre 
level, regarding which films should be retained and which should be dropped from week to 
week.  In our future work we hope to apply models of duration analysis to these more micro-
level decisions.
25   
                                                                                                                                                             
level, and INCDIFF, falling just below the .10 level, with a p-value of 0.129. 




Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for First-Run Theatres in Boston Metropolitan Market 
June 30, 2000-Jun 22, 2001 
  
All Theatre Pairs 
 
Theatre Pairs with Same  
Owners Only 
 
Theatre Pairs with Different  
Owners Only 
Variable  Mean St.  Dev. Min.  Max.  Mean St.  Dev. Min.  Max.  Mean St.  Dev. Min.  Max. 
























































0.28 0.45 0.00  1.00  1.00 0.00 1.00  1.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
DISTANCE 
 
18.74 11.63  1.24 54.04  19.99 11.04  2.58 44.93  18.25 11.82  1.24 54.04 
SCREEN DIFF 
 
5.08 3.65 0.00  15.00  5.23 3.34 0.00  13.00  5.08 3.77 0.00  15.00 
HOLIDAYDISTANCEt 
 
4.33 3.09 0.00  10.00  4.33 3.09 0.00  10.00  4.33 3.09 0.00  10.00 
AGEDIFF 
 
1.48 0.97 0.03  3.56  1.63 0.94 0.03  3.22  1.42 0.98 0.08  3.56 
INCOMEDIFF 
 
14.13 11.38  0.02 46.42  14.31 11.69  0.10 37.66  14.05 11.25  0.02 46.42 
POPULATIONDIFF 
 
35.12 24.36  0.46 74.15  35.57 23.47  0.46 72.12  34.95 24.71  1.92 74.15 
HOUSEHOLDDIFF  14.85  10.36 0.34  31.39  14.83 9.84  0.15  29.98  14.86  10.56 0.34  31.39 
Similarity indexes are based on showtime counts. 
Demographic difference variables are based on comparisons of values within a five-mile radius of each theatre, for each ij pair, from 2001 Census estimates.  Age and 
income differences based on comparisons of average age and average income (measured in thousands of 2001 dollars).  Population and households measured in 10,000s.   
Total number of observations is 4,056.  Total number of observations with same owner is 1,144; total number of observations with different owners is 2,912. Table 2.  Estimation of Angular Show-Count Similarity Index  


































INCOMEDIFF   -0.20 
(-1.82)* 
 
    
Sample Size  4056  4056 
R
2  0.2428 0.2269 
F value  91.08  76.14 
Estimation by pooled OLS with Rogers standard errors, clustered by theatre pair. 
Dependent variable is SAt, the angle between theatre-pair attributes vectors, using showtime counts.   
Age and income differences are based on comparisons of average age and average income, in thousands of 2001 
dollars, within a five-mile radius of each theatre, for each ij theatre pair, from 2001 Census estimates. 






Table 3.  Estimation of Angular Movie-Count Similarity Index  


































INCOMEDIFF   -0.167 
(-1.74)* 
 
    
Sample Size  4056  4056 
R
2  0.2581 0.2399 
F-value 93.49  84.36 
Estimation by pooled OLS with Rogers standard errors, clustered by theatre pair. 
Dependent variable is SAt, the angle between theatre-pair attributes vectors, using movie counts.   
Age and income differences are based on comparisons of average age and average income, in thousands of 2001 
dollars, within a five-mile radius of each theatre, for each ij theatre pair, from 2001 Census estimates. 






Table 4.  Estimation of Normalized Matching Show-Count Similarity Index  





























INCOMEDIFF   0.22 
(1.69)* 
 
    
Sample Size  4056  4056 
R
2  0.1430 0.1523 
F value  50.62  17.494 
Dependent variable is SMt, the normalized matching index, using showtime counts.   
Age and income differences are based on comparisons of average age and average income, measured in thousands 
of 2001 dollars, within a five-mile radius of each theatre, for each ij theatre pair, from 2001 Census estimates. 
Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01; t-values reported in parentheses. 
 



























































































































































All Observations Same Owner Only Different Owner Only Holiday Distance  












































All Observations Same Owner Only  Different Owner Only Holiday Distance  
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